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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY IN
CHRISTOPHERSEN V. ALLIED-SIGNAL CORP.: THE




It is a commonplace observation that the use of expert testimony
has increased dramatically in the last decade. A recent research project
studied the use of expert testimony in 529 civil cases in California Supe-
rior Court. I Expert witnesses appeared in 86% of those trials. 2 The
overall average was 3.3 expert witnesses per trial.3 This same period of
time witnessed a virtual "explosion of toxic tort ... litigation"4 in which
expert witnesses play a particularly important role. In a toxic tort case,
the crucial issue is often medical causation 5 and the plaintiff ordinarily
needs expert testimony to establish medical causation.
6
In 1986, Professor Charles Nesson published a widely-cited article.
7
In that article, he argued that the courts should liberally admit expert
testimony on the issue of medical causation in toxic tort cases. Professor
Nesson emphasized the differences between the legal and scientific stan-
dards of certainty.8 As Professor Nesson wrote,
[A] . . . scientist exploring the hypothesis that a given toxic
agent causes cancer is . . .likely to suspend scientific judgment
on the ultimate question of causation until more testing.., can
be done to eliminate alternative hypotheses. A doctor or law-
yer or judge, on the other hand, often does not have the luxury
of postponing a decision .... [W]e ask juries to come to conclu-
sions without insisting on or waiting for scientific demonstra-
tion. The legal standard of proof ... require[s] only a rational
basis for the expert's opinion-a standard far short of scientific
demonstration.9
* Professor of Law, University of California at Davis; former Chair, Evidence Sec-
tion, American Association of Law Schools; B.A., 1967; J.D., 1969, University of San
Francisco.
1. Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1113, 1119 (1991).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Roy A. Cohen & Jodi F. Mindnich, Expert Testimony and the Presentation of Scientific
Evidence in Toxic Tort and Environmental Hazardous Substance Litigation, 21 SETON HALL L. REV.
1009, 1009 (1991).
5. EDWARD GREER & WARREN FREEDMAN, Toxic TORT LITIGATiON § 5.1 (1989 &
Supp. 1991).
6. See id. at ch. 5.
7. Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Factfinding at the Frontier of Knowl-
edge, 66 B.U. L. REV. 521 (1986).
8. Id. at 529.
9. Id. at 529-30.
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More specifically, Professor Nesson contended that the courts should
permit an expert to opine on medical causation so long as the opinion is
based on reasonable clinical judgment.' 0 In Professor Nesson's judg-
ment, an expert testifying about medical causation should not be re-
stricted to relying on formal scientific demonstrations such as
epidemiological studies."I For example, assume that the body of scien-
tific knowledge about a particular type of cancer is incomplete and that
there is inadequate experimentation to validate the hypothesis that the
toxic agent in question causes that type of cancer. Professor Nesson be-
lieves that a physician's opinion on causation should nevertheless be ad-
missible if as a diagnostician exercising "his best medical judgment,"
the physician would treat the patient on the assumption that the toxic
agent was the most likely cause of the cancer.' 2
Within the past five years, several commentators have criticized Pro-
fessor Nesson's position that the courts should apply liberal standards to
determine the admissibility of medical causation testimony in toxic tort
cases. The leading critic has been Peter Huber, the author of Galileo's
Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom.13 Mr. Huber argues that as a result
of the liberalization of evidentiary standards, the courts have permitted
the presentation of spurious causation theories--"junk science"-to ju-
ies. In turn, juries have returned inaccurate plaintiffs' verdicts and
wrongfully imposed additional costs on defendants.
It would be fair to say that more and more courts are responding to
these criticisms and rejecting Professor Nesson's position. To be sure,
there is a split of authority over the question.14 "The pendulum," how-
ever, has clearly swung away from Nesson's view.' 5 When the question
presented is whether a given toxic agent causes a particular illness, such
as a type of cancer, the trend has been to require formal scientific proof
of causation. The courts have dismissed clinical judgments as unreliable
and unscientific speculation.' 6 Some courts have ruled that as a general
proposition, the expert must base his or her causation opinion on a gen-
erally accepted scientific theory. 17 Other courts have restricted the ex-
pert to specific types of scientific proof such as epidemiological studies'
8
or research published in peer-reviewed journals.' 9
10. Id. at 526, 529-30.
11. Id. at 526.
12. Id. at 528.
13. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO's REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991).
14. Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4; Michael C. McCarthy, Note, "Helpful" or "Rea-
sonably Reliable"? Analyzing the Expert Witness's Methodology Under Federal Rules of Evidence 702
and 703, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 350, 372-73 (1992).
15. Recent Case, Evidence-Admissibility of Scientific Evidence-Fifth Circuit Limits Permissi-
ble Scientific Evidence to Generally Accepted Theories-Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp.,
939 F.2d 1106, (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (per curiam)., 105 HARV. L. REV. 791, 791 (1992).
16. Id. at 793; Harwell v. American Med. Sys., Inc., 803 F. Supp. 1287, 1298 (M.D.
Tenn. 1992).
17. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 320 (1992).
18. McCarthy, supra note 14 at 364, 368, 375, 392.
19. Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1130-31.
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In mid-1991, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rendered an
en banc, per curiam decision in Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp.20 The
Christophersen case became a cause celebre. 2 1 The consensus is that the
Christophersen decision is in step with the judicial trend to demand formal
scientific demonstration of causation and the decision is viewed as an
important "signal" that in the future, the courts will take a more restric-
tive approach to the admission of expert testimony on causation.
22
In mid-1992, the publicity for another scientific evidence case,
Daubert,2 3 eclipsed the notoriety of the Christophersen decision. 24 In
Daubert, the plaintiffs' experts relied on a reanalysis of epidemiological
data to prove their theory that the anti-nausea drug Bendectin can cause
birth defects. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
scientific testimony was admissible only if plaintiffs could prove that
their experts' theory was generally accepted. 2 5 The court further ruled
that proving the acceptance of an expert's theory required a showing
that the theory was supported by studies published in peer-reviewed
journals. 26 On October 13, 1992, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Daubert.27 The Court's decision in Daubert promises to clarify the
standard for determining the admissibility of expert testimony when the
expert employs a distinctively scientific methodology such as epidemio-
logical analysis. Notwithstanding the importance of clarifying that test,
Daubert should not be permitted to obscure the broader question raised
by Christophersen.
In Christophersen, the plaintiffs were the survivors of a deceased for-
mer employee of Marathon Manufacturing Co. 28 The cause of the dece-
20. 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
21. Richard 0. Faulk, The Unanswered Questions of Christophersen v. Allied-Signal
Corp., 4 VILL. ENVIRONMENTAL L.J. 21 (1993);Bruce L. James, Fryed Expert Witnesses: The
5th Circuit Takes Charge of Scientific Testimony, 12 REV. LITIG. 171 (1992); Barry J. Nace &
Thomas H. Bleakley, How Much Evidence Is Enough?, TRIAL, Aug. 1990, at 38; Rebecca L.
Hunt, Note, The Need for an Appropriate Standard for Admission of Expert Witness Testimony in
Toxic Tort Cases, 16 AM.J. TRIAL ADVOC. 573 (1992); Kimberly M. Skaggs, Case Comment,
Limiting the Admissibility of Expert Testimony: Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 53 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1185 (1992); Fifth Circuit Formulates Stiff Test For Admitting Toxic Tort Expert Opinion,
60 U.S.L.W. 1042 (1991); Gary Taylor, Expert Witness Opinion Eyes; Circuits Split on the Issue,
NAT'L. L.J., Oct. 21, 1991, at 3.
22. Recent Case, supra note 15 at 791-92.
23. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 320 (1992).
24. David E. Bernstein,Junk Science in the Courtroom, WALL ST.J., Mar. 24, 1993, at AIS;
Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court to Examine Scientific Proof, NAT'L. L.J., Feb. 1, 1993, at 1; Paul M.
Barrett, Top Court Agrees to Clarify Use of Scientific Evidence in Trials, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14,
1992, at B9; Joan Biskupic, High Court to Review Expert-Witness Standards in Product Case,
WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1992, at A6; Linda Greenhouse, High Court to Decide Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence in U.S. Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1992, at Al; 'Junk Science" and justice:
Court Will Decide When Expert Opinions Are Admissible, MISSOULIAN, Oct. 14, 1992, at A3; Tony
Mauro, Bendectin Case to Test 'Junk Science", USA TODAY, Oct. 14, 1992, at 9A.
25. Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1129.
26. Id. at 1131.
27. 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992).
28. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 902 F.2d 362, 363 (5th Cir. 1990) (Chris-
tophersen I), superseded by 939 F.2d 1106, 1108 (5th Cir. 1991) (Christophersen II), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
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dent's death was a small-cell cancer that originated in his colon and
metastasized to his liver.2 9 While he worked for Marathon, the decedent
was exposed to nickel and cadmium fumes.3 0 The plaintiffs contended
that the exposure caused the decedent's cancer. To prove medical cau-
sation, the plaintiffs presented a clinician's affidavit. 3 ' On the one hand,
the clinician, Dr. Miller, conceded that there was no formal scientific
proof that exposure to nickel and cadmium fumes can cause small-cell
cancer of the colon; he acknowledged that there were no human epide-
miological, live animal, or in vitro studies validating the hypothesis of a
causal connection.3 2 Unlike the plaintiffs' experts in Daubert, Dr. Miller
did not purport to rely exclusively on distinctively scientific methodol-
ogy such as epidemiological analysis. On the other hand, Dr. Miller
noted that "[s]cience so far has established specific [causal] links of
nickel and cadmium to lung, prostate, and renal cancers." 3 3 Dr. Miller
then added that as a matter of histology, small-cell cancer of the colon
has the same appearance or morphology as small-cell lung, prostate, or
renal cancer.3 4 He also pointed out that "the biochemical reaction" be-
tween small-cell cancer and colon tissue is apparently the same as the
reaction between such cancer and tissue in the lung, prostate, or renal
area.
3 5
In a memorandum opinion, the trial judge struck Dr. Miller's opin-
ion as inadmissible and granted the defendant summary judgment.
3 6
The en banc Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial
judge's decision.3 7 The per curiam lead opinion rejected Dr. Miller's
opinion as an untrustworthy "scientific hunch."
'3 8
The en banc Court of Appeals treated the Christophersen case as a
run-of-the-mill problem of medical causation testimony. The lead opin-
ion professed that in excluding Dr. Miller's opinion, the court did not
need to "introduce ... new concepts to .. .[its] jurisprudence."3 9 This
short article asserts that the court-and, for that matter, the litigants-
erred in assuming that the Christophersen fact situation was a typical case.
The thesis of this article is that quite to the contrary, the Christophersen
case raised a novel question, namely, whether an expert witness should
be permitted to rely on nonscientific reasoning, here analogical reason-
ing that falls short of formal scientific proof. The Supreme Court's
eventual decision in Daubert may prescribe the standard for assessing the
validity of a scientific methodology, but Christophersen poses the more
fundamental question of whether an expert such as Dr. Miller with a
29. Christophersen II at 1108.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1124.
32. Id. at 1115.
33. Id. at 1124, 1133.
34. Id. at 1115, 1133-34.
35. Id. at 1115 n.16.
36. Christophersen 1, 902 F.2d at 363.
37. Christophersen 11, 939 F.2d at 1108.
38. Id. at 1115.
39. Id. at 1110.
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scientific background must rest his or her opinion on uniquely scientific
techniques.
The first part of this article surveys the current state of the case law,
that is, the division of authority over the question whether expert scien-
tific witnesses must base their causation opinions on scientific methodol-
ogies such as human epidemiological and live animal studies. The
second part of the article describes the Christophersen case. This part of
the article details both the state of the evidentiary record and the judicial
opinions filed at the trial and appellate levels. The third part of the arti-
cle argues that even though there were no formal scientific studies to
support Dr. Miller's opinion, his opinion was admissible. The thrust of
this section of the article is that although analogical reasoning is not a
distinctively scientific methodology, it is a valid mode of reasoning
which an expert should be permitted to rely upon. The conclusion of
this article points to the broader significance of Christophersen. In the fi-
nal analysis, the per curiam opinion in Christophersen rests on the notion
that in order to give admissible testimony, scientific witnesses must rely
on exclusively scientific reasoning techniques. As we shall see, that no-
tion is neither self-evident nor true. The modes of valid reasoning are
too numerous and variegated to endorse the simplistic notion underly-
ing the per curiam opinion.
I. THE CURRENT SPLIT OF AUTHORITY OVER THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY ON MEDICAL CAUSATION
A. Courts Adopting a Liberal Attitude Toward Admissibility
As previously stated, in 1986 Professor Nesson published his fa-
mous article about scientific testimony on medical causation.40 In his
article, Professor Nesson emphasized the distinctions between the legal
and scientific cultures. Most importantly, he emphasized that the stan-
dards of proof differ. In Nesson's words, the law requires "neither abso-
lute certainty . . . nor the exacting level of certainty that scientists
employ for the demonstration of scientific propositions."-4 1 As he ex-
plained, it is feasible for scientists to "wait for a high degree of certainty
and reliability" to emerge.4 2 A research scientist may suspend judg-
ment until additional testing or experimentation can be conducted. 4 3 In
contrast, neither a clinician treating an ill patient nor a court adjudicat-
ing the patient's toxic tort claim has the luxury of postponing a deci-
sion.4 4 Professor Nesson concedes that the court should not permit a
finding based on rank speculation, 4 5 but he adds that "a rational ba-
40. Nesson, supra note 7.
41. Id. at 529. See also Bunting v. Secretary of Dept. of Health and Human Serv., 931




45. Id. at 531. See also Gay Men's Health Crisis v. Sullivan, 792 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y.
1992).
19931 477
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
sis" 4 6-sufficient evidence to sustain a permissive inference-is
acceptable.
Professor Nesson is certainly correct in arguing that legal and scien-
tific standards of proof diverge. In the typical civil case, the burden of
proof is a mere preponderance of the evidence. 4 7 That standard tends
to equate with anything exceeding a 50% probability.48 However, when
a scientist employs hypothesis testing, 49 the popular convention is to
accept the hypothesis only if the hypothesis is validated at the 0.05 level
of statistical significance. 50 A 0.05 significance level indicates that the
observed outcome should occur by chance only once out of twenty
times.
51
In light of these obvious differences between legal and scientific
standards of proof, a number of courts have opted to adhere to Profes-
sor Nesson's position. 5 2 Perhaps the most forceful decision embracing
that position is the opinion of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
in Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co. 5 3 The court declared:
[A] cause-effect relationship need not be clearly established by
animal or epidemiological studies before a doctor can testify
that, in his opinion, such a relationship exists. As long as the
basic methodology employed to reach such conclusion is
sound, ... [the] law does not preclude recovery until a "statisti-
cally significant" number of people have been injured or until
science has had the time and resources to complete sophisti-
cated laboratory studies of the chemical. In a courtroom, the
test for allowing a plaintiff to recover in a tort suit of this type is
not scientific certainty but legal sufficiency; if reasonable jurors
could conclude from the expert testimony that [the toxin in
question] more likely than not caused [the plaintiff's] injury,
the fact that . . .science would require more evidence before
conclusively considering the causation question resolved is
irrelevant.
54
Courts subscribing to this school of thought have a strong prefer-
ence that the jury ultimately resolve any dispute between opposing ex-
46. Nesson, supra note 7 at 530.
47. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 339 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
48. United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (Judge Weinstein's sur-
vey of district judges in the Eastern District of New York), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
49. See PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 15-5
(2d ed. 1993).
50. David H. Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1333,
1342-44 (1986).
51. Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211, 1225 n.1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 640
(1991); Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 566 F. Supp. 1166, 1173 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 797
F.2d 1478 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1105 (1989).
52. E.g., Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 493 U.S. 1074 (1990).
53. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
54. Id. at 1535-36. See also Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4 at 1031 n.77 (citing
Longmore v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 737 F. Supp. 1117 (D. Idaho 1990) as authority for
the distinction between legal sufficiency and scientific certainty).
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perts. 55 They assert that traditionally the Sixth and Seventh
amendments require that jurors serve as the arbiters of a "battle of the
experts." 56 These courts believe the testimony should be ruled admissi-
ble; the jury should be permitted to hear the testimony unless the ex-
pert's reasoning is so "illogical, outlandish, or totally speculative ...
that no reasonable jury could accept the opinion."
5 7
B. Criticism of the Liberal Attitude
Within recent years, Professor Nesson's position has been subjected
to sharp criticism. At one level, the criticism is evidentiary; at another
level, the criticism is economic. At the first level, the criticism is that the
liberal judicial attitude toward the admissibility of scientific evidence has
paved the way for the introduction of expert testimony that is both con-
jectural and unreliable. 58 Mr. Huber charges that the relaxed admissi-
bility standards have made it easier for quacks
5 9  to foist
"pseudoscientific" 60 testimony off on lay jurors. In Huber's opinion,
this testimony is highly speculative, 6 1 and in some cases the expert's un-
derlying theory is simply spurious.
62
The economic criticism is closely tied to the evidentiary criticism.
The critics argue that in many cases, the admission of spurious expert
testimony has prompted wrongful verdicts increasing the defendants'
transaction costs. 63 "In numerous recent instances, toxic tort defend-
ants have been driven into bankruptcy." 64 The President's Council on
Competitiveness joined in this criticism. 6 5 The Council contended that
the imposition of these additional transaction costs has placed American
businesses at a competitive disadvantage in world markets-a conten-
tion likely to strike a responsive chord with anyone concerned about the
current economic situation.
C. The Judicial Response to the Criticism of the Liberal Attitude
Subsection A describes one school ofjudicial thought on the admis-
sibility of scientific testimony on medical causation. Subsection B re-
viewed some of the criticisms of that school. Partially in response to
55. Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4 at 1022; Conde v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 804 F.
Supp. 972, 985-86, 996-97 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
56. Christophersen 11, 939 F.2d at 1128.
57. Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4 at 1033 (quoting Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp.,
576 A.2d 4, 6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990)).
58. Peter W. Huber, Quoth the Maven, 23 REASON 40 (Nov. 1991).
59. Id. at 42.
60. Id. at 43, 46.
61. Id. at 46. See also McCarthy, supra note 14 at 376 (quoting Brock v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., 874 F.2d 307, 309, modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1511 (1990)).
62. Peter W. Huber, On Law and Sciosophy, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 319, 320 (1990).
63. Robert F. Blomquist, Science, Toxic Tort Law, and Expert Evidence: A Reaction to Peter
Huber, 44 ARK. L. REV. 629, 642 (1991).
64. Id. at 633.
65. Edward J. lmwinkelried, Abolish the "Frye" Test: Relevancy Is a Better Standard for
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 12 CAL. LAWYER 63 (Apr. 1992).
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those criticisms, a second school of thought has developed. 66 The
courts subscribing to this school believe that judges proffered such ex-
pert testimony must perform an active screening or gate-keeping func-
tion.6 7 The argument runs that expert testimony on this issue must be
subjected to rigorous examination 68 and that the judge should be allo-
cated the responsibility to subject the testimony to close scrutiny.6 9
The courts committed to this school of thought tend to exclude ex-
pert testimony based on anything short of formal scientific methodol-
ogy. 70 These courts demand admissible scientific proof of causation; 7 1
the expert's opinion must have a rigorous "scientific foundation."' 72 Mr.
Huber urges that the courts embrace the rule that the expert must rest
his or her opinion on a generally accepted or consensus scientific hy-
pothesis. 73 Some lower courts indicate that any traditional scientific
technique (human epidemiological studies, live animal testing, or in vitro
studies) is acceptable. 74 Other courts insist that the expert base the cau-
sation opinion on epidemiological studies 75 or even more narrow epide-
miological studies finding a causal nexus at a certain level of statistical
significance, such as 0.05.76
This strict approach 77 to the admissibility of expert testimony on
causation contrasts sharply with the attitude of the courts embracing
Professor Nesson's view. This split of authority serves as the backdrop
of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Christophersen.
II. A DESCRIPTION OF THE CHRISTOPHERSEN COURT'S POSITION ON
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY ON MEDICAL
CAUSATION
A. The Lower Court Evidentiary Record
In March 1986, Albert Christophersen died of small-cell cancer that
66. Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4 at 1024.
67. Id.
68. McCarthy, supra note 14 at 360 (quoting In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. 1223,
1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aft'd on other grounds, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1234 (1988)).
69. Id.
70. E.g., DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 791 F. Supp. 1042, 1056-57 (D. N.J. 1992)
(physician's clinical background was insufficient, since epidemiological proof was neces-
sary and the physician lacked expertise in that area).
71. Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 966 F.2d 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
72. Porter v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1335, 1347 (S.D. Ind. 1992).
73. See generally HUBER, supra note 13.
74. Christophersen H, 939 F.2d at 1115.
75. Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 311-15 (5th Cir.), modified, 884
F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990); Lynch v. Merrell-National
Lab., 830 F.2d 1190, 1194 (Ist Cir. 1987).
76. Michael Dore, A Proposed Standard for Evaluating the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in
Toxic Tort and Other Personal Injury Cases, 28 How. L. J. 677, 693-95 (1985); Michael D.
Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of
Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643 (1992); Jan Feldman &John Del
Giorno, Toxic-Tort Case: Court Eases Standard of Proof, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 18, 1991, at 19; Nace
& Bleakley, supra note 21 at 38.
77. Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4 at 1024.
480 [Vol. 70:3
ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
began in his colon and spread to his liver. During the 20 years preced-
ing his death he had worked for Marathon Manufacturing Company. In
the final 14 years he was employed at Marathon's Waco, Texas plant.
That plant was a facility for manufacturing nickel/cadmium batteries.
Christophersen was never directly involved in the manufacturing pro-
cess, but his job duties necessitated that he visit the manufacturing area
frequently. In the course of those visits, he was allegedly exposed to
nickel and cadmium fumes.
After Albert's death, his surviving wife and child filed suit against
Marathon under the Texas Wrongful Death and Survival Statute.7 8 The
Christophersens' complaint alleged that nickel and cadium fumes were
the producing cause of Albert's death. The complaint also averred that
Marathon was aware of the dangerous nature of these chemicals and vio-
lated its duty to provide the decedent with a safe place to work or to
warn him of the dangers.
The defendant Marathon moved for summary judgment. To defeat
the motion, the plaintiffs made a straightforward syllogistic argument.
79
The plaintiffs' major premise was that exposure to nickel and cadmium
particles can cause small-cell cancer of the colon. The minor premise
was that while he worked for the defendant, the decedent had substan-
tial exposure to nickel and cadmium fumes. The conclusion was that the
exposure ultimately caused Albert Christophersen's death.
To prove up their minor premise, the plaintiffs offered the affidavit
of Edgar Manoliu. Manoliu had been one of the decedent's co-workers
at the Waco plant. Manoliu's affidavit stated that during the 14 year
period preceding his death, Albert Christophersen had been exposed to
"many fumes and gases," including "airborne particles of cadmium and
nickel alloys." 8 0 Manoliu did not know the precise chemical composi-
tion of the fumes, and he could not quantify the level of the decedent's
exposure. Manoliu's affidavit, however, referred to "tremendous" re-
leases of fumes, monthly nickel and/or cadmium spills, and leaks in the
pipes transferring nickel nitrate and cadmium nitrate. 8'
To establish their major premise, the plaintiffs relied on the affidavit
of Dr. Lawrence Miller. Dr. Miller was a board-certified specialist in in-
ternal medicine with an "extensive ... clinical background .... ,,82 At a
deposition filed with the court, Dr. Miller acknowledged that the tradi-
tional scientific techniques of establishing medical causation are human
epidemiological studies, live animal tests, and in vitro research.8 3 While
the plaintiffs' experts in Daubert relied on epidemiological reanalysis, Dr.
Miller stated that he had not employed any formal scientific techniques
to establish a causal connection between exposure to cadmium and
78. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.001-.031 (West 1986).
79. See Edward J. lmwinkelried, The "Bases " of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of
Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1988).
80. Christophersen 1, 902 F.2d at 365.
81. Christophersen 11, 939 F.2d at 1123 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 1124 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 1115 (per curiam).
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nickel fumes and small-cell cancer of the colon.8 4 He conceded that "he
had never seen an epidemiological or animal study demonstrating a
causal association between exposure to nickel and/or cadmium and co-
lon cancer."
8 5
Despite those concessions, Dr. Miller opined that such exposure
can cause small-cell cancer of the colon. He reasoned to that conclusion
in two steps. Initially, he noted that "[s]cience . . .has established spe-
cific links of nickel and cadmium to lung, prostate, and renal cancers."
8 6
That nexus had been proven by traditional scientific techniques. Next,
Dr. Miller identified a number of similarities between small-cell colon
cancer and small-cell lung, prostate, and renal cancers. Under the mi-
croscope, "small-cell carcinoma appears to be the same cell (identical
histology) regardless of its location in the body .... 87 Dr. Jacqueline
Torell, who performed the autopsy after the decedent's death, con-
firmed that the morphology of all such cancers is "quite similar." 8 8 Dr.
Miller also pointed out that the biochemical reaction resulting in the
development of small-cell carcinoma would be the same whether the re-
action occurred in the colon or one of the other sites such as the lung.
8 9
The defense countered with its own expert affidavits. Those affida-
vits asserted that human epidemiological research, live animal tests, and
in vitro studies are the accepted scientific methodologies for establishing
medical causation.9 0 The affiants declared that a scientifically valid
proof of causation would "require[] clearly positive results from one or
more of these types of testing."9' The affiants stated, as Dr. Miller had
conceded, that there were no such tests demonstrating a causal associa-
tion between small-cell colon cancer and exposure to cadmium and
nickel.9 2 The affiants asserted that without such tests, the hypothesis of
such an association could not be deemed "scientifically" validated or
"correct." 9 3
B. The Judicial Evaluations of the Evidentiary Record
The trial judge, a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and
the en banc Fifth Circuit evaluated this evidentiary record.
The Trial Court Decision. The trial judge filed a memorandum opin-
ion.9 4 Following the second school of thought described in Section I,
supra, the judge undertook an "in-depth review" of Dr. Miller's reason-
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1121 (Clark, C.J., concurring).
86. Id. at 1124, 1133 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 1133-34 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 1125 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
89. Chnstophersen I, 902 F.2d at 366.
90. Chrstophersen 11, 939 F.2d at 1115.
91. Id.
92. Christophersen 1, 902 F.2d at 366.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 364 n.20.
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ing.9 5 The trial judge concluded that Dr. Miller's opinion was "unrelia-
ble" 96 because Dr. Miller did not employ the traditional scientific
techniques of establishing medical causation.9 7 The judge, therefore,
struck Dr. Miller's opinion as inadmissible. 98 Since that opinion was the
linchpin of the plaintiffs' major premise on causation, the judge then
ruled that, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs' proof was insufficient. 9 9 The
judge consequently granted Marathon's summary judgment motion.10 0
The Decision by the Fifth Circuit Panel. In 1990, the plaintiffs prose-
cuted an appeal to a panel of the Fifth Circuit.' 0 ' The panel, including
Judges Reavley, King, and Johnson, reversed the trial judge. The panel
emphasized the importance of the jury's role as the arbiter of disputes
between conflicting expert opinions.' 0 2 The panel stated that the jury
ordinarily assesses the credibility and weight of testimony, including sci-
entific evidence.10 3 The panel stated that the trial judge had improperly
"chose[n] sides in this battle of the experts and thereby usurped the role
of the jury .... "104
The panel acknowledged, as Dr. Miller had conceded, that Miller's
opinion was not based on any epidemiological, animal, or in vitro stud-
ies 10 5 directly establishing a link between small-cell colon cancer and
exposure to nickel and cadmium fumes. The panel pointed, however, to
scientific studies establishing a link between such exposure and cancer
discovered in the lung, kidney, and prostate.' 0 6 The panel underscored
Dr. Miller's testimony about the similarity of both morphology of small-
cell cancer and the biochemical reaction in those sites and the colon.1
0 7
Citing the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' decision in Ferebee,'0 8
the panel rejected the defense's invitation to rule that a finding of medi-
cal causation requires proof through statistically significant epidemio-
logical studies. 10 9 The panel concluded that Dr. Miller's opinion had
sufficient factual support to be submitted to a jury."10
The Decision by the En Banc Fifth Circuit. After the panel decision, the
defense petitioned the Fifth Circuit for rehearing en banc. The court
granted the petition; and, upon rehearing, over vigorous dissents a ma-
jority of the en banc court voted to affirm the trial judge.' I The lead
95. Id. at 364. The later per curiam opinion uses the same expression to characterize
the trial judge's analysis of Dr. Miller's reasoning. Christophersen 11, 939 F.2d at 1109.
96. Christophersen 1, 902 F.2d at 364 n.2.
97. Id. at 364-66.
98. Id. at 366.
99. Id. at 363.
100. Id.
101. Christophersen I., 902 F.2d at 362.
102. Id. at 364.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 366.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 367.
107. Id. at 365-66.
108. Id. at 367.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Christophersen H, 939 F.2d at 1106.
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opinion was per curiam, and Chief Judge Clark filed a separate opinion
concurring in the result affirming the trial judge.
The lead, concurring, and dissenting opinions touched upon the
sufficiency of Manoliu's affidavit to serve as Dr. Miller's minor premise.
However, our primary interest is the various judges' analysis of the ad-
missibility of testimony about Dr. Miller's major premise, that is, his hy-
pothesis that cadmium and nickel fumes can cause small-cell colon
cancer. The per curiam opinion faulted Dr. Miller's major premise on
the ground that he had not validated his hypothesis "in a scientifically
valid way." ' 1 2 The majority noted Dr. Miller's concession that he could
not point to any human epidemiological, live animal, or in vitro studies
to substantiate his hypothesis."l 3 The majority then cited the defense
experts' statements that a formal scientific demonstration of causation
would "require[] positive results from one or more of these types of
testing." ' 4 Given these statements, the majority found that Dr. Miller's
reasoning was "scientifically [in]correct" ' ' 5 because he had not em-
ployed traditional "scientific methodology.""l 6 The majority concluded
that the trial judge had properly ruled Miller's opinion inadmissible as
an unreliable "scientific hunch."" 17
Like the per curiam lead opinion, ChiefJudge Clark's concurrence
criticized Dr. Miller's reasoning.' 18 Judge Clark dismissed Dr. Miller's
"associative reasoning" as lacking a "foundation in medical science." 19
He noted the absence of any epidemiological, animal, or in vitro studies
demonstrating a causal nexus between colon cancer and nickel and cad-
mium exposure. 120 In Chief Judge Clark's judgment, Dr. Miller's rea-
soning was "seriously deficient."12'
The judges signing the per curiam and concurring opinions repre-
sented a majority of the en banc Fifth Circuit. There were, however, two
dissents. One dissent, a rather polemic opinion, was authored by Judge
King, one of the members of the original panel. 12 2 Judge King accused
the majority of attempting to skew toxic tort litigation against "penuri-
ous plaintiffls]."' 23 He noted that a plaintiff's victory in a massive toxic
tort suit can cause "severe ... economic disruptions," 124 but he added
that it is the legislature's province to modify substantive Tort law to pre-
vent such disruptions. 12 5 In his opinion, the majority had "placed a...
112. Id. at 1115.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1116.
116. Id. at 1115.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1116, 1121-22 (Clark, C.J., concurring).
119. Id. at 1121.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1136-38 (King, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 1136-37.
124. Id. at 1137.
125. Id.
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hurdle in the path of toxic tort plaintiffs"' 2 6 "in order to tilt toxic tort
litigation in favor of defendants."' 127 Judge King condemned the per
curiam opinion as "result-oriented decision-making."' 12 8
The other dissent was written by Judge Reavley, 129 who had au-
thored the panel opinion. In his dissent, as in his earlier panel opinion,
Judge Reavley carefully reviewed the evidentiary record below. At the
outset of his dissent, Judge Reavley commented on Dr. Miller's "exten-
sive . . . clinical background."' 3 0 He twice mentioned the scientific re-
search establishing that cadmium and nickel exposure can cause small-
cell lung, prostate, and renal cancer. 13 1 Judge Reavley then pointed to
the parallels which Dr. Miller had drawn between the small-cell cancers
in various sites. Judge Reavley noted Dr. Miller's testimony that regard-
less of its location, small-cell carcinoma has the same appearance-
"identical histology" or morphology.
132
As in his earlier panel opinion, Judge Reavley admitted that there
were no epidemiological, animal, or in vitro studies demonstrating a
causal link between small-cell colon cancer and cadmium and nickel ex-
posure. 133 He further admitted that those techniques are "[t]he ordi-
nary routes" to establishing "scientific certainty."' 134 Like Professor
Nesson before him, however, Judge Reavley forcefully asserted that the
standards of law and science differ in that "[c]ourts do not require scien-
tific certainty."i 3 5 In his view, the evidentiary record below presented a
classic battle of the experts; 13 6 and in resolving the battle as a matter of
law, the trial judge and majority judges had arrogated to themselves the
credibility determination which the jury was entitled to make.
13 7
III. A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE CHRISTOPHERSEN COURT'S
POSITION: THE MAJORITY'S FAILURE To RECOGNIZE THE
VALIDITY OF NONSCIENTIFIC REASONING By
SCIENTIFIC WITNESSES
None of the opinions filed in Christophersen explicitly recognized the
most unique facet of that case: the attempt by a scientist, Dr. Miller, to
rely on nonscientific analogical reasoning rather than traditional scien-
tific methodologies such as epidemiological research.
The range of expert testimony on such subjects as medical causa-
tion can be visualized as a spectrum. One end of the spectrum is formal
scientific demonstration of causation. At that end of the spectrum, the
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1138.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1122-36 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 1124.
131. Id. at 1124, 1133.
132. Id. at 1125, 1133-34.
133. Id. at 1135.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1128.
137. Id.
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ideal may be a human epidemiological study finding a causal relation-
ship with a high level of statistical significance.' 3 8 Other traditional sci-
entific methodologies such as animal and in vitro studies also would fall
near that end of the spectrum.' 3 9 Courts and commentators alike re-
gard these methodologies as highly reliable.
At the opposite end of the spectrum lies the variation hypothesized
by Professor Nesson. If an opinion rests on nothing more than a diag-
nostician's hunch or educated guess, the opinion is necessarily conjec-
tural and its reliability is suspect. For example, relatively little is known
about AIDS and a court might exclude a diagnostician's opinion about
the cause of a patient's AIDS as unduly speculative. The reliability of an
opinion increases slightly if the expert can point to anecdotal data sup-
porting the opinion, 140 but, as in the case of a mere hunch, some courts
have held that anecdotal information is too flimsy a basis for an admissi-
ble expert opinion.
14 1
The Christophersen fact pattern was unique because the case falls
squarely in the middle of the spectrum. The majority correctly observed
that Dr. Miller had not employed traditional, formal scientific methodol-
ogies such as epidemiological studies. However, Dr. Miller presented
far more than a diagnostician's hunch or anecdotal data. In the final
analysis, his reasoning was reducible to a paradigmatic analogical argu-
ment. ' 4 2 The proposition he analogized to was the hypothesis that cad-
mium and nickel exposure can cause small-cell lung, prostate, and renal
cancer. As Judge Reavley pointed out in both his panel and dissenting
opinions, 143 that hypothesis had evidently been established by tradi-
tional scientific methodology. Dr. Miller in effect argued that there was
an apt analogy between small-cell colon cancer and small-cell carcinoma
in other sites on the bases of identical histology and biochemical reac-
tions. 144 Dr. Miller may never have used the term, "analogy;" but on
even cursory analysis, it becomes clear that his reasoning was analogical.
Moreover, there is no indication in either the panel or en banc decisions
that the defense experts could find any fault with the analogy. Their
only counterargument was that his reasoning did not fit the mold of clas-
sic scientific methodology. The thesis of this article is that Dr. Miller
ought to have been permitted to rely on nonscientific analogical reason-
ing. Neither logic nor legislation bars a scientific expert from using ana-
logical reasoning as the basis for an admissible opinion.
138. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
140. Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4 at 1039.
141. Id. (collecting cases).
142. ROBERTJ. KREYCHE, LOGIC FOR UNDERGRADUATES 238-40 (1961).
143. Christophersen 1, 902 F.2d at 367; Christophersen II, 939 F.2d at 1122 (Reavley, J.,
dissenting).
144. Christophersen 1, 902 F.2d at 366; Christophersen H, 939 F.2d at 1122, 1124-25, 1134
(Reavley, J., dissenting).
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A. In principle, analogical reasoning is a permissible basis for an expert
opinion by a scientific witness.
The rationale of the per curiam opinion in Christophersen can be re-
stated in these terms: The expert witness, Dr. Miller, was a scientist;
however, Dr. Miller's reasoning did not rest on any distinctive scientific
methodologies such as epidemiological studies; and therefore, his rea-
soning is invalid. However, once the rationale is restated in this fashion,
it becomes clear that the rationale is a non sequitur. The hidden assump-
tion is that when the witness has a scientific background, the reasoning
supporting the witness' testimony can be valid only if the reasoning
passes muster under scientific standards of certainty. Simply stated, that
assumption is fallacious; analogical reasoning is not a peculiarly scien-
tific mode of analysis, but in principle such reasoning is a valid mode of
analysis.
Logicians uniformly recognize the validity of analogical reason-
ing. 14 5 An analogy rests on a comparison."' 6 If the comparison is apt,
the reasoning is valid. 147 Analogical reasoning is used extensively in
philosophy.14 8 For that matter, the courts routinely employ analogical
reasoning. 14 9 A fortiori 150 is a common expression in the cases, and a
fortiori arguments rest on analogical reasoning. '51 The courts have even
invoked analogical reasoning in cases adjudicating the admissibility of
scientific evidence. 15
2
Even more significantly, although analogical reasoning is not a
uniquely scientific mode of analysis, on occasion scientists resort to anal-
ogy. The per curiam 153 and concurring 154 opinions both emphasized
the lack of animal studies establishing a connection between small-cell
colon cancer and exposure to cadmium and nickel. Both opinions
strongly suggest that Dr. Miller's testimony would have been admissible
145. KREYCHE, supra note 142 at 238-41.
146. Id. at 239.
147. Id.
148. 1 B.A.G. FULLER & STERLING M. MCMURRIN, A HISTORY OF ANCIENT AND MEDIE-
VAL PHILOSOPHY 29 (rev. 3d ed. 1955).
149. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS
97-99 (4th ed. 1988) (the role of analogy in the growth of the doctrine of promissory
estoppel in American Contract law); Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481 (1834) (Britton is the
seminal American Contract case announcing that a plaintiff in default on an employment
contract may have a right to limited restitution from the defendant employer; in deciding
to recognize the right, the court relied in part on the "close analogy" between employ-
ment and construction contracts).
150. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 61 (6th ed. 1990).
151. KREYCHE, supra note 142 at 240. Indeed, it can be argued that the primary method
of reasoning in the Anglo-American case system is analogical. EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949). If the judge finds an apt analogy between the in-
stant case and an earlier precedent, the judge extends precedent to the current case.
However, when the judge finds that the analogy is inapt, the judge refuses to apply the
earlier precedent.
152. United States v.Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 794 (2d Cir.) ("the existence of an analo-
gous relationship with other types of scientific techniques and results that are routinely
admitted into evidence .... "), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992).
153. Christophersen II, 939 F.2d at 1115.
154. Id. at 1121 (Clark, C.J., concurring).
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if there had been animal studies supporting his hypothesis as to the cau-
sation of small-cell colon cancer in human beings. What both the per
curiam and concurring opinions failed to recognize is that the use of
animal studies to validate hypothesis about human illness is undeniably
analogical reasoning. There are important differences between animals
and human beings. 155 Yet when an animal experiment is well designed
and the differences are carefully explored at trial, courts permit experts
opining about human illness to analogize to the results of animal stud-
ies. 15 6 Government agencies routinely rely on animal studies as a basis
for promulgating toxicity standards for human beings.15 71ndeed, the
per curiam and concurring judges arguably would have permitted a
longer analogical leap than they forbade Dr. Miller from making. Dr.
Miller's analogy compared carcinoma in one human organ to cancer in
other organs. Despite the evident differences between animals and
human beings, those judges seemingly would have permitted Dr. Miller
to have analogized between cancer in animals and cancer in human
beings.
The counterargument might be made that the argument in favor of
expert analogical reasoning proves too much. It might be contended,
for example, that a clever charlatan' 5 8 masquerading as an expert will
always be able to draw an analogy, however strained, to an adequately
validated hypothesis. If so, the counterargument runs, this argument
will enable such charlatans to testify about any theory however
speculative. 1
59
The counterargument assumes, though, that the lower courts are
incompetent to police the aptness of the claimed analogy. When the
proponent proffers expert testimony, the proponent has the burden of
establishing the existence of all the foundational or preliminary facts
conditioning the admissibility of the testimony. 160 If the proponent
claims that the expert is relying on an apt analogy, the aptness of the
analogy becomes a preliminary fact for the judge to determine. In nu-
merous reported cases, although experts have drawn analogies, courts
have rejected the analogy and screened out unreliable evidence.161 The
155. Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4 at 1038-39.
156. Id. at 1039. See also Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360 (6th
Cir. 1992) ("Animal studies often comprise the backbone of evidence indicating biological
hazards, and their legal value has been recognized by federal courts and agencies.").
157. In 1991, the Environmental Protection Agency issued Final Guidelines for Devel-
opmental Toxicity Risk Assessment. 56 Fed. Reg. 63,798 (1991). The Guidelines assert
that an assessment of the hazard posed by alleged toxic to human beings requires the
consideration of "animal ... data .... " Id. at 63,799. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae
American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics at 10-13, Daubert et al. v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., (U.S.) (No. 92-102). Footnote 7 of the brief sets out an extensive "list of
federal laws, regulations and standards in which animal studies are used to assess human
health risks .... Id. at 13-14.
158. Huber, supra note 58 at 42.
159. Id. at 46.
160. FED. R. EviD. 104(a)-104(b).
161. State v. Stout, 478 S.W.2d 368 (Mo. 1972) (rejecting an analogy between neutron
activation analysis of hair and NAA of blood); People v. Alston, 362 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1974) (rejecting a proposed analogy between fresh blood samples and dried
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cases demonstrate that the courts will not uncritically accept the claimed
analogy at face value.
Concededly, standing alone an expert opinion based on analogical
reasoning may not be legally sufficient to sustain a plaintiff's burden of
production on the issue of medical causation. Suppose the worst possi-
ble state of the record for the plaintiffs: Based on an analogy, an expert
is willing to testify only that it is possible that exposure to cadmium and
nickel fumes cause small-cell colon cancer; the expert truthfully con-
cedes that she cannot vouch that causation is either certain or probable.
Since the ultimate burden of proof is a preponderance of the evi-
dence 16 2 and, at least in some minds, that standard equates with proof
of a probability exceeding 50%,16s the expert's testimony would not sat-
isfy the plaintiff's burden.
The question presented here, though, is the admissibility of the ex-
pert's testimony rather than the legal sufficiency of the evidence to sup-
port a plaintiff's verdict.164 At one time, there was extensive authority
for the proposition that to be admissible, an expert's opinion had to be
couched as either a probability or certainty. 165 However, the Federal
Rules of Evidence do not codify that requirement.' 6 6 Under Federal
Rule of Evidence 702, an expert opinion can be admitted if the opinion
would "assist the trier of fact."' 16 7 Many, if not most, jurisdictions have
abandoned any categorical rule that an expert opinion must be stated as
a probability or certainty to be admissible. 168 Even an opinion phrased
as a possibility can help or assist the trier of fact. The judge could con-
sistently admit the opinion about medical causation but ultimately rule
that cumulatively, plaintiff's evidence of causation is legally insuffi-
cient. 169 In short, the supposed legal insufficiency of the expert's ana-
blood stains); People v. Law, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (rejecting an analogy
between sound spectrography studies involving male Caucasians speaking naturally and a
fact situation in which an Afro-American woman was charged with making a threatening
call in a disguised voice); Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4 at 1038 (discussing courts'
refusal to accept analogies to animal studies); Nesson, supra note 7 at 525-26 (mentioning
Judge Weinstein's refusal to rely on animal studies in the Agent Orange Litigation).
162. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 47 at § 339.
163. United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (Judge Weinstein's sur-
vey of judges sitting in the Eastern District of New York), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
164. Christophersen 11, 939 F.2d at 1122, 1130 (Reavley, J., dissenting) ("evidentiary suf-
ficiency rather than admissibility").
165. EdwardJ. Imwinkelried & Robert G. Scofield, The Recognition of an Accused's Consti-
tutional Right to Introduce Expert Testimony Attacking the Weight of Prosecution Science Evidence:
The Antidote for the Supreme Court's Mistaken Assumption in California v. Trombetta, 33 ARIz. L.
REV. 59, 69 (1991).
166. Id.
167. FED. R. EVID. 702.
168. Imwinkelried & Scofield, supra note 165 at 69.
169. It should be noted, though, that in Christophersen, Dr. Miller's affidavit did not
merely advance the analogical reasoning. Dr. Miller also attempted to exclude other pos-
sible causes of the decedent's carcinoma:
Dr. Miller considered the various possibilities of alternative causation. Chris-
tophersen was not a smoker. Mrs. Christophersen smoked, but Dr. Miller consid-
ered this source insufficient for Christophersen's small-cell colon cancer. Nor
was Christophersen a heavy drinker. Dr. Miller noted that associations of alcohol
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logical reasoning to sustain the plaintiff's burden would be no bar to the
admissibility of the expert's testimony.
B. A scientific witness' opinion, based on analogical reasoning, is admissible
under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Again, the rationale of the per curiam opinion in Christophersen is the
implicit assumption that a scientific expert must base his or her testi-
mony exclusively on distinctively scientific methodologies. As the pre-
ceding subsection noted, as a matter of logic, that assumption is
simplistic and flawed. The per curiam invokes several provisions of the
Federal Rules of Evidence to rationalize its decision; but on close scru-
tiny, it becomes clear that the Federal Rules do not impose any scientific
straitjacket on witnesses who happen to have a scientific background. 1
70
Vary the facts in Christophersen. Assume that Dr. Miller had been Mr.
Christophersen's treating physician. Further suppose that the plaintiffs
had joined a survival action for the decedent's pain and suffering with
their wrongful death action. At trial, they call Dr. Miller to testify to the
decedent's statement describing his then existing pain; the decedent
made the statement during a physical examination by Dr. Miller. The
decedent's declaration would fall within the hearsay exception for asser-
tions of then existing bodily condition.' 7 ' Any person who had first-
hand knowledge of the declaration-that is, anyone who had heard the
declaration-would therefore be competent to testify to the declaration
under Federal Rule of Evidence 602.172 If a layperson was in the room
when Mr. Christophersen made the statement, she would unquestiona-
bly be competent under Rule 602; she would have personal knowledge
of the fact that Christophersen made the statement. It would be non-
sense to exclude Dr. Miller's testimony about Christophersen's state-
ment simply because Dr. Miller happened to be a scientist. 173 In this
hypothetical, Dr. Miller heard the oral statement with his own ears; and
he should be permitted to testify to that statement-whether he has an
M.D., B.S., R.N., or nothing behind his name.
and gastrointestinal carcinoma generally occur with chronic alcoholics. Dr. Miller
found no evidence of exposure to asbestos, nor was there evidence of hereditary
or family associations of small-cell cancer.
Christophersen 11, 939 F.2d at 1125 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
170. This Article assumes that the federal courts no longer have the power to promul-
gate general exclusionary rules of evidence by common law process. There is a powerful
argument that Federal Rule of Evidence 402 deprives the courts of that power. Edward J.
Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402: The Second Revolution, 6 REV. LITIG. 129 (1987).
Other commentators have recognized that the Supreme Court has adopted a textualist or
"plain meaning" approach to the construction of the Federal Rules. Randolph N.
Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 TEX. L. REV.
745 (1990) Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen
Years - The Effect of "Plain Meaning "Jurisprudence, The Need for an Advisory Committee on Rules
of Evidence and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 G.W.L. REV. 857 (1992); Glen
Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1307 (1992).
171. FED. R. EvIo. 803(3).
172. FED. R. EVID. 602.
173. RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES 519 (3d ed. 1991).
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Change the facts again. Now suppose that as further evidence of
the decedent's pain and suffering, the plaintiffs call Dr. Miller to testify
that during the physical evaluation, he carefully studied the decedent's
nonverbal demeanor and that based on that demeanor, he, Miller, is of
the opinion that the decedent appeared to be in pain. That testimony
would be admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 701 governing the
admissibility of lay opinion testimony.174 The case law construing Rule
701 indicates that a person's suffering or pain is a proper subject for lay
opinion testimony.' 75Once again, if a layperson were in the room and
observed the same demeanor, she would be permitted to opine on that
basis. Dr. Miller was in the room, and his opinion rests on the identical
basis. It makes no difference that he happens to have a scientific back-
ground. Since his lay opinion satisfies Rule 701, the testimony is other-
wise admissible; and, it would be ludicrous to exclude the testimony on
the ground that scientific witnesses must confine their testimony to
opinions resting on scientific methodology.
Now revisit the original facts in Christophersen. Dr. Miller is not at-
tempting to testify to an observed fact under Rule 602 or to express a
lay opinion under Rule 701. Rather, he is endeavoring to voice an ex-
pert opinion under Rule 702. Rule 702 reads:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
176
The per curiam opinion would have the reader believe that if the witness
qualifies as an expert by virtue of scientific "knowledge ... training, or
education," the expert must base his opinion on "scientific" knowledge
or, more narrowly, on distinctive scientific methodology. The rub, of
course, is that the statute does not say that.
The critical language in Rule 702 is "scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge."' 17 7 On its face, the statute does not restrict the
expert witness to opinions resting on "scientific knowledge." The stat-
ute lists three different types of knowledge, "scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge."' 78 The statutory language obviously
treats "specialized" knowledge as the genus and "scientific" knowledge
as the species; but the per curiam opinion in Christophersen would permit
the species to swallow up the genus. Moreover, the connective in Rule
702 is "or."' 179 "Or" is a disjunctive term. 180 It is well-settled that
174. FED. R. EvID. 701; Carter v. Steere Tank Lines, Inc., 835 S.W.2d 176, 182 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1992) ("While DPS troopers often possess the training and expertise to qualify as
expert witnesses in traffic collision cases, this qualification does not preclude them from
also giving lay opinions.").
175. 2 GREGORY P. JOSEPH & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FED-
ERAL RULES IN THE STATES § 50.3, at 75 (1991 Cum. Supp.).
176. FED. R. EvID. 702.
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when a legislature uses that connective, its use manifests a legislative
intent that alternatives are permissible.' 8 1 Since Congress selected the
connective "or,"1 8 2 Congress must have intended that scientific, techni-
cal, or more generally specialized knowledge would be a permissible ba-
sis for an expert opinion. In some cases such as Daubert, the expert will
avow relying on uniquely scientific reasoning; but Rule 702 does not
compel the expert to do so.
The case law construing Federal Rule 702 bears out that conclu-
sion. The cases are legion permitting local police and Federal Bureau of
Investigation agents to testify about code words and customary practices
of organized crime and drug rings.' 8 3 Needless to say, these witnesses
have not conducted systematic, scientific studies of the practices of
criminals.' 8 4 Rather, they have accumulated experience which gives
them a "specialized knowledge" helpful to lay jurors and judges. Un-
doubtedly, by happenstance some of these witnesses have had scientific
backgrounds or degrees; but no one would ever think to object to the
admission of their testimony on the ground that they did not employ
classic scientific methodology to develop the body of knowledge they are
drawing upon. The courts routinely admit this type of testimony, ' 8 5 and
that routine practice is eminently correct. Congress surely intended that
the expression, "technical, or specialized knowledge," in Rule 702
would have independent significance18 6 -- some meaning other than
"scientific knowledge."
The only remaining question is whether Dr. Miller's reasoning can
be characterized as valid "specialized knowledge" within the intendment
of that expression in Rule 702. The preceding subsection demonstrated
the validity of analogical reasoning. The issue then is the meaning of
"specialized" knowledge. When a legislature uses a term, the normal
presumption is that the legislature intended the common 18 7 or diction-
ary' 8 8 meaning of the term. The dictionary meaning of "specialized"
knowledge would be the knowledge of "a particular occupation or
180. BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY 1095 (6th ed. 1990); 30 WORDS AND PHRASES 53, 54
(1972 & Supp. 1992).
181. Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Hous. Ctr., 815 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Johnson, 791 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Mo. 1992).
182. Congress resorted to the connective "and" when Congress wanted to make it
clear that requirements were to be enforced conjunctively. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 701.
183. EdwardJ. Imwinkelried & Ephraim Margolin, The Case for the Admissibility of Defense
Testimony About Customary Political Practices in Official Corruption Prosecutions, 29 AMER. CRIM. L.
REV. 1, 17-21 (1991) (collecting authorities).
184. Id. at 20; State v. Sanders, 832 P.2d 1326, 1329 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
185. Imwinkelried & Margolin, supra note 183 at 17-21.
186. United States v. Flores, 968 F.2d 1366 (1st Cir. 1992); Horn v. Commissioner,
968 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1992); R. E. Dietz Corp. v. United States, 939 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.
1991); Haynes v. United States, 891 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1989); Darling v. Bowen, 878 F.2d
1069 (8th Cir. 1989); In re Roxford Foods Litig., 790 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Cal. 1991); Marc
Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 771 F. Supp. 1163 (D. Utah 1991); Fox-Knapp, Inc. v. Employers Mut.
Casualty Co., 725 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y.), afftd, 893 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1989).
187. General Motors Corp. v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 641 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1991).
188. Id.; Lyons v. United States, 794 F. Supp. 238 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Bahnmiller v.
Derwinski, 724 F. Supp. 1208 (E.D. Va. 1989), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 923 F.2d 1085
(4th Cir. 1991).
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branch of knowledge."' 189 In contrast, "general" knowledge would be
information accessible to "every member" of society or at least "the ma-
jority of individuals in society."' 190
That is the meaning ascribed to "specialized knowledge" by the de-
cided cases construing Rule 702 as permitting expert testimony by law
enforcement officers familiar with criminals' code words and practices.
Those officers have knowledge which a lay judge or juror is unlikely to
possess; and for that very reason, the officer's description of that knowl-
edge would probably, in the words of Rule 702, "assist the trier of
fact."' 9 ' Dr. Miller's reasoning passes muster under this standard. The
judge and jurors are unlikely to know that a demonstrated connection
exists between small-cell lung, prostate, and renal cancer. Similarly, it is
unrealistic to assume that they know of the similar histology and bio-
chemical reactions between cancer in those sites and small-cell colon
cancer. Those propositions are "specialized knowledge." Further, as in
the case of expert testimony about criminals' customary practices, Dr.
Miller's testimony about those propositions would "assist [a] trier of fact
• .. to determine [the] fact in issue"' 192 of whether the decedent's expo-
sure to cadmium and nickel fumes at the defendant's plant caused his
small-cell carcinoma. In all probability, laypersons would be unfamiliar
with the scientific research demonstrating the causal connection to lung,
prostate, and renal cancer; and, without the benefit of Dr. Miller's testi-
mony, they would not appreciate the aptness of the bases for the anal-
ogy to colon cancer. Hence, the admission of Dr. Miller's testimony
would be perfectly consistent with the letter of Rule 702. Moreover,
since Dr. Miller's opinion rested on valid analogical reasoning, its ad-
mission would comport with the spirit of the Federal Rules as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
On the one hand, in legal analysis it is critical to avoid blurring fun-
damental distinctions. Overlooking elementary distinctions often leads
to faulty reasoning and inaccurate outcomes. In American Evidence law
in particular, it is vital to respect distinctions and draw the necessary
lines. In the United States, for example, Evidence law has drawn lines
based on the character and hearsay rules. We distinguish between im-
proper character uses of evidence and legitimate noncharacter uses; the
Federal Rules of Evidence permit a litigant to introduce evidence of the
opposing client's misconduct when the misconduct has the special,
noncharacter probative value but bar the evidence when the litigant's
only theory of relevance is "he did it once, therefor he did it again."' 193
Likewise, the Federal Rules announce a general rule excluding uncross-
examined hearsay but allow a litigant to introduce testimony about out-
189. WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 839 (1972).
190. Id. at 347.
191. FED. R. EVID. 702.
192. Id.
193. FED. R. EvID. 404-05; EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT Evi-
DENCE Ch. 2 (1984).
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of-court statements when the statement is relevant for a nonhearsay pur-
pose and there consequently is no need to cross-examine the out-of-
court declarant.' 94 In both cases, the enforcement of the distinction is
calculated to shield the litigants from supposedly prejudicial evidence
which the jurors might misuse. 195
On the other hand, it is equally important to avoid erecting artificial
barriers in the law. The life's work of the late ChiefJustice Roger Tray-
nor of the California Supreme Court is illustrative. When Traynor first
joined the court, there were rigid doctrinal barriers between Contract
and Tort doctrines in American law. Traynor's insight was that there
were general principles of fault and liability that transcended those bar-
riers. 19 6 That insight enabled him to import Tort concepts into Con-
tract law to refine the doctrine of promissory estoppel.19 7 In the same
vein, he introduced Contract notions into Tort law to help shape the
modern theory of strict product liability. 19 8 Traynor foresaw the pos-
sibilities for law reform that would arise once he repudiated the dichot-
omy between Contract and Tort.
In Christophersen, the judges signing the per curiam opinion endeav-
ored to impose a rigid dichotomy on expert opinion law. The judges
attempted to narrowly cabin testimony by scientific witnesses. Their un-
derlying assumption is that scientific witnesses differ from all other ex-
perts and that if they are to opine at all, scientific witnesses must derive
their conclusions exclusively through peculiarly scientific methodologies
such as epidemiological studies. Since Dr. Miller was a scientist,' 9 9 he
was obliged to use such methodologies to support his medical causation
opinion. He had not done so, and it therefore seemed patent to those
judges that his opinion was inadmissible.
As we have seen, though, that assumption is unsound. That as-
sumption certainly has not been codified in the text of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Rule 702 does not even purport to restrict scientific wit-
nesses to the use of distinctively scientific techniques such as animal
studies. Rather, Rule 702 explicitly authorizes the admission of evi-
dence of propositions of "specialized knowledge" when the witness is
qualified in the pertinent specialty and testimony about the proposition
would "assist" the trier of fact. "[Sipecialized knowledge" is expansive
enough to include the propositions which Dr. Miller relied on, his cre-
dentials qualified him as an expert on those propositions, and those pro-
positions would be helpful to a trier of fact grappling with the question
of medical causation of small-cell colon cancer. As a matter of statutory
194. FED. R. EvID. 801-802; CARLSON ET AL., supra note 173 at 575-80.
195. Miguel A. Mendez, California's New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code Section
352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1003 (1984); Peter Miene
et al., Juror Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 683
(1992).
196. Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958).
197. Id.; Southern Cal. Acoustics Co. v. C. V. Holder, Inc., 456 P.2d 975 (Cal. 1969).
198. 1 Louis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1.02, at 1-32 to
1-36 (1993) (discussing the influence of Justice Traynor).
199. Christophersen 11, 939 F.2d at 1122, 1124 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
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construction, the assumption underlying the per curiam opinion is
indefensible.
More fundamentally, that assumption is illogical. The starting point
of the per curiam opinion's rationale is that Dr. Miller was a scientist.
That point is not only obvious; Dr. Miller and the dissenters freely con-
ceded the point. However, it is fallacious to leap from that starting point
to the ultimate conclusion that Dr. Miller was required to base any ex-
pert opinion on peculiarly scientific methodologies such as epidemiolog-
ical studies. The per curiam opinion insists that Dr. Miller's reasoning
must qualify for the label "scientific," but the only meaningful question
is whether his reasoning deserves the appellation "valid." Analogical
reasoning is a valid mode of analysis even if it is not a distinctively scien-
tific methodology. The per curiam judges conceded as much when they
indicated that they would have allowed Dr. Miller to ground an expert
opinion on animal studies. A scientist extrapolating from animal studies
to human medical causation is analogizing, pure and simple. Like a sci-
entist relying on animal studies, Dr. Miller proposed to employ analogi-
cal reasoning. He explained the bases for his analogy; and, as best as we
can tell from the en banc Chnstophersen opinion, neither the defense ex-
perts nor the per curiam judges came to grips with his argument nor
found any fault with his analogical reasoning. They merely asserted that
as a scientist, Miller's only choice was to employ peculiarly scientific
techniques such as epidemiological research.
In the final analysis, the per curiam opinion in Christophersen is nar-
row-minded. As the British philosopher John Tyndall once remarked,
the human mind is an "instrument with a certain range of notes."
20 0
That remark holds true whether the human being in question is a layper-
son or a scientist. Tragically, the real failing of the per curiam opinion
is that the opinion was blind to the diversity of modes of valid reasoning
of which the human mind is capable.
200. Quoted in THE SHORTER BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 408 (Kathleen Sproul
ed. 1960).
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